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ABSTRACT
Online gaming is a multi-billion dollar industry that en-
tertains a large, global population. One unfortunate phe-
nomenon, however, poisons the competition and the fun:
cheating. The costs of cheating span from industry-supported
expenditures to detect and limit cheating, to victims’ mon-
etary losses due to cyber crime.
This paper studies cheaters in the Steam Community, an
online social network built on top of the world’s dominant
digital game delivery platform. We collected information
about more than 12 million gamers connected in a global
social network, of which more than 700 thousand have their
profiles flagged as cheaters. We also collected in-game in-
teraction data of over 10 thousand players from a popular
multiplayer gaming server. We show that cheaters are well
embedded in the social and interaction networks: their net-
work position is largely undistinguishable from that of fair
players. We observe that the cheating behavior appears to
spread through a social mechanism: the presence and the
number of cheater friends of a fair player is correlated with
the likelihood of her becoming a cheater in the future. Also,
we observe that there is a social penalty involved with being
labeled as a cheater: cheaters are likely to switch to more re-
strictive privacy settings once they are tagged and they lose
more friends than fair players. Finally, we observe that the
number of cheaters is not correlated with the geographical,
real-world population density, or with the local popularity
of the Steam Community.
This analysis can ultimately inform the design of mech-
anisms to deal with anti-social behavior (e.g., spamming,
automated collection of data) in generic online social net-
works.
1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of online gaming led to the creation of
a billion dollar industry, but also to a vigorous cheat code
development community that facilitates unethical in-game
behavior. “Cheats” are software components that imple-
ment game rule violations, such as seeing through walls or
automatically targeting a moving character. It has been
recently estimated that cheat code developers generate be-
tween $15, 000 and $50, 000 per month from one class of
cheats for a particular game alone [4].
In all cultures, players resent the unethical behavior that
breaks the rules of the game: “The rules of a game are abso-
lutely binding [...] As soon as the rules are transgressed, the
whole play-world collapses. The game is over [17]”. Online
gamers are no different judging by anecdotal evidence, vit-
riolic comments against cheaters on gaming blogs, and the
resources invested by game developers to contain and pun-
ish cheating (typically through play restrictions). For some
cheaters, the motivation is monetary. Virtual goods are
worth real-world money on eBay, and online game economies
provide a lucrative opportunity for cyber criminals [19, 20].
For other cheaters, a competitive advantage and the desire
to win is motivation enough [23].
Cheating is seen by the game development and distribu-
tion industry as both a monetary and a public relations
problem [8] and, consequently, significant resources are in-
vested to contain it. For example, Steam, the largest dig-
ital distribution channel for PC games, employs the Valve
Anti-Cheat System (VAC) that detects cheats and marks
the corresponding user’s profile with a permanent, publicly
visible, red, “ban(s) on record”. Game servers can be config-
ured to be VAC-secured and reject players with a VAC-ban
on record matching the family of games that the server sup-
ports. The overwhelming majority of servers available in the
Steam server browser as of October 2011 are VAC-secured.
For example, out of the 4,234 Team Fortress 2 servers avail-
able on October 12, 2011, 4,200 were VAC-secured. Of the
34 non-secured servers, 26 were servers owned and adminis-
trated by a competitive gaming league that operates its own
anti-cheat system.
Gaming mimics, to some extent, real-world interactions [29].
Understanding the cheaters’ position in the social network
that connects gamers is relevant not only for evaluating
and reasoning about anti-cheat measures in gaming envi-
ronments, but also for studying social networks at large.
Cheaters are unethical individuals who can model the po-
sition of individuals in large-scale non-hierarchical commu-
nities that abuse the shared social space. In online social
networks, they can model the abuse of available, legal tools,
such as intensive use of communication tools for political
activism. Taken to the extreme, such behavior leads to
the tragedy of the commons: all players become cheaters
and then abandon the game; corruption escalates and chaos
takes place; and communication is buried in noise.
Like many gaming environments, Steam allows its mem-
bers to declare social relationships and connect themselves
to Steam Community, an online social network. This work
reports on our analysis of the Steam Community social graph
with a particular focus on the position of the cheaters in the
network. To enable this study, we crawled the Steam Com-
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munity and collected data for more than 12 million users.
Our analysis targets the position of cheaters in the networks;
evidence of homophily between cheaters; geo-social charac-
teristics that might differentiate cheaters from the fair pop-
ulation; and the social consequences of the publicly visible
cheating flag.
Our study shows that cheaters are well embedded in the
social network; they exhibit a high degree of homophily;
their geo-social characteristics differ from those of non-cheaters;
and while the cheating flag does not a affect their aggregate
well being in the gaming environment, it is penalized by
friendship loss, shorter in-game interactions, and marked by
some degree of embarrassment (as suggested by more fre-
quent changes to private profiles). Additionally, our tem-
poral analysis of the cheating data suggests that cheating
behavior spreads via social relationships: the presence and
the number of cheater friends of a fair player is correlated
with the likelihood of her becoming a cheater in the future.
An overview of related work is presented in Section 2. The
datasets we collected are presented in Section 3, along with
our data collection methodology. Section 5 analyzes the po-
sition of cheaters in the network from the perspective of de-
clared relationship, in-game interactions, and the strength
of their relationships measured via social-geographical met-
rics. It also presents the effect of the VAC-ban on individual
players. Section 6 reasons about possible mechanisms for
spreading the cheating behavior. Section 7 concludes with
a summary of our findings and their consequences.
2. RELATED WORK
Cheating in social gaming is a relatively unexplored area.
Nazir et al. study fake profiles created to gain an advan-
tage in social gaming contexts in [23]. Through the evalu-
ation of behavior of player accounts within Fighters’ Club
(FC), a game on the Facebook Developer Platform, they are
able to predict with high accuracy whether a profile is fake.
Users in FC cheat by creating fake profiles to gain an ad-
vantage (i.e., they perform a Sybil attack), whereas cheaters
in Steam Community are not trying to alter the structure
of the social graph. Instead, they are attacking game rule
implementations.
“Gold farmers” are cheaters that make black market ex-
changes of real world currency for virtual goods outside of
sanctioned, in game, trade mechanisms. By examining so-
cial networks constructed from database dumps of banned
EverQuest II (EQ2) players, Keegan et al. found gold farm-
ers exhibit different connectivity and assortativity than both
their intermediaries and normal players, and are similar to
real-world drug trafficking networks [19]. Ahmad et al. [1]
further examined trade networks of gold farmers and the
items they trade and propose models for deviant behavior
prediction.
Their data set differs from ours in both motivation for
cheating, and the method of punishing cheaters. No clear
financial motivation for cheating exists in the majority of
games played by Steam Community players. Additionally,
while cheaters in EQ2 have their accounts permanently dis-
abled, cheaters in Steam Community are only restricted
from playing the particular game they were caught cheat-
ing in on VAC-secured servers, as explained in Section 3.
Finally, we note that to the best of our knowledge, this
is the largest scale study of cheaters in a gaming social net-
work. We discovered over double the amount of cheaters as
there were players in [23], and multiple orders of magnitude
more cheaters than players in [19, 1].
Although not much quantitative analysis has been per-
formed, cheating in video games has been studied qualita-
tively. Duh and Chen describe several frameworks for an-
alyzing cheating, as well as how different cheats can im-
pact online communities in [11]. Neopets, a web based social
game, was examined by Dumitrica in [12]. She describes a
process by which gamers, who naturally seek ways to in-
crease their “gaming capital”, are tempted to cheat, and
argues that a cheating culture emerges from social games,
where social values are used to understand and evaluate the
ethical questions of cheating.
Social networks of online gamers have been addressed in
recent studies. Szell and Thurner [29] provide a detailed
analysis of the social interactions between players in Pardus,
a web-based Massively Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG).
They employee, as we do in this study, traditional tools from
social network analysis, however, there are a few significant
differences in the datasets used. First, declared relationships
between users in the Steam Community OSN are informed
by underlying in-game interactions, but exist in a more gen-
eral “gaming” context than in Pardus, where the social net-
work is built on interactions within the context of one game.
Second, players in Pardus can declare friends and enemies.
In our study, players can only declare friends. While we do
provide some results based on interaction data from a Team
Fortress 2 (TF2) server, TF2 players do not declare friends
and foes, but compete on ad-hoc, opposing teams. Finally,
while there might be cheaters present in the Pardus dataset,
they are not identified or studied in anyway.
Xu et al. [32] interviewed 14 Halo 3 players to study the
meaning of relationships within an online gaming context.
Halo 3 is a multiplayer First Person Shooter (FPS) avail-
able on the Xbox game console, similar in style and stature
to the most played games on Steam. They found evidence
of in-game relationships being supported by real-world rela-
tionships, triadic closure of relationships making use of both
real and virtual relationships as a bridge, and in-game in-
teractions strengthening ties in the real world. They further
found evidence of social control as a tool for managing de-
viant behavior. In addition to in game interactions on a
single game server, we also measure and analyze the social
structure of millions of online gamers and their relationships
with the deviant class of users that cheat.
General gaming studies have been prompted by the popu-
larity of online gaming. There has been significant interest in
understanding the technological needs for supporting gam-
ing platforms. Consequently, various studies characterized
network traffic due to gaming, resource provisioning, work
load prediction, and player churn in online games [6, 7, 13,
14, 15]. Other studies have focused on the psychological and
social properties of gamers [16] and gaming communities [5,
31, 9].
3. DATASETS
In order to better understand the datasets, we start by
describing the Steam Community network. Run by Valve,
who also develops some of the most successful multiplayer
first-person shooter games, Steam controls between 50% and
70% of the PC digital download market and is more prof-
itable per employee than Google and Apple [28]. It claims
more that 30 million user accounts as of October 2011.
While games from a number of developers and publishers
are available for purchase on Steam, an important segment
is formed by the multiplayer FPS genre. In contrast to mas-
sively multiplayer online games, multiplayer FPSs usually
take place in a relatively “small” environment, player actions
generally do not affect the environment between sessions,
and instead of one logical game world under the control of
a single entity, there are multiple individually-owned and
operated servers. Because there is no central entity control-
ling game play and since there is a very large number of
servers to choose from, the communities that form around
individual servers are essential to the prolonged health of a
particular game.
3.1 The Steam Community
Recognizing the social nature of gaming in general, Valve
created the Steam Community. Steam Community is a so-
cial network comprised of Steam users, i.e., people who buy
and play games on Steam. To have a Steam Community
profile, one first needs to have a Steam account and take the
additional step of configuring a profile. Users with a Steam
account and no profile (and thus, not part of the Steam Com-
munity) can participate in all gaming activities, and can be
befriended by other Steam users, but no direct information is
available about them. Steam profiles are accessible in game
via the Steam client and are also available in a traditional
web based format at http://steamcommunity.com.
Valve also provides the Valve Anti-Cheat (VAC) service
that detects players who cheat and marks their profiles with
a publicly visible, permanent VAC ban. Server operators
can “VAC secure” their servers: any player with a VAC ban
for a given game can not play that game on VAC secured
servers (but they are allowed to play other games). In an
effort to stymie the creators and distributors of cheats and
hacks, the details of how VAC works are not made public.
What is known is that VAC bans are not issued immedi-
ately upon cheat detection, but rather in delayed waves, as
an additional attempt to slow an arms race between cheat
creation and detection.
While Steam accounts are free to create, they are severely
restricted until associated with a verifiable identity, such as
resulted from game purchases (via a credit card) or from a
gift from a verified account. Once associated with an ac-
count, game licenses (whether bought or received as a gift)
are non-transferable. This serves as a disincentive for users
to abandon flagged accounts for new ones: abandoning an
account means abandoning all game licenses associated with
that account. Moreover, Sybil attacks become infeasible,
as they would require monetary investments and/or a real-
world identity even for the most trivial actions, such as chat-
ting with other players.
3.2 Data Collection
In our analysis we used three data sources. The vast
majority of our data was obtained by crawling the Steam
Community website to collect user profiles and the result-
ing social network. In order to augment profile information
with the (approximate) time of VAC bans, we queried the
vacbanned.com site. And finally, we obtained in-game inter-
actions from a Team Fortress 2 server located in California.
Crawling the Steam Community: At the time of the
data collection, a rate-limited web API for accessing Steam
was available, but it was restricted to summary informa-
tion that excluded friend lists. Unfortunately, in addition
to being limited to 100,000 calls per day, the web API does
not provide access to the friend list, but only to limited
summary information for a user. As an alternative, Steam
Community data is made available via unmetered, consum-
able XML. Using the unmetered, consumable XML on the
Steam Community web site, we crawled during March 16th
and April 3rd, 2011. The majority of the data (over 75%)
was collected between March 25th and March 31st. The
crawler collected user profiles by starting from a randomly
generated set of SteamIDs and following the friendship rela-
tionships declared in user profiles. To seed our crawler, we
generated 100,000 random SteamIDs within the key space
(64-bit identifiers with a common prefix that reduced the ID
space to less than 109 possible IDs), of which 6,445 matched
configured profiles.
The crawling was executed via a distributed breadth first
search. Each of the initial seed SteamIDs was pushed onto
an Amazon Simple Queue Service (SQS) queue. Each crawler
process popped one SteamID off this queue and retrieved
the corresponding profile data via a modified version of the
Steam Condenser library. The profile data of the crawled
user was stored in a database and any newly discovered
users (i.e., friends that were previously unseen) were added
to the SQS queue. Crawling proceeded until there were no
items remaining in the queue. Using RightScale, Inc’s cloud
computing management platform to automatically scale the
crawl according to the number of items in the SQS queue,
we ended up running up to six Amazon “c1.medium” EC2
instances executing up to 15 crawler processes each.
A Steam profile includes a nickname, a privacy setting
(public, private, friends only or in-game only), set of friends
(identified by SteamIDs), group memberships, list of games
owned, gameplay statistics for the past two weeks, a user-
selected geographical location, and a flag (VAC-ban) that in-
dicates whether the corresponding user has been algorithmi-
cally found cheating. We augmented the information for the
VAC-banned players with a timestamp that signifies when
the VAC ban was first observed (as explained next).
From our initial 6, 445 seeds of user ids, we discovered just
about 12.5 million user accounts, of which 10.2 million had
a profile configured (about 9 million public, 313 thousand
private, and 852 thousand visible to friends only). There
are 88.5 million undirected friendship edges and 1.5 million
user-created groups. Of the users with public profiles, 4.7
million had a location set (chosen from 33,333 pre-defined
locations), 3.2 million users with public profiles played at
least one game in the two weeks prior to our crawl, and 720
thousand users are flagged as cheaters. Table 1 gives the
exact numbers.
Collecting VAC Ban Timestamps: We collected
historical data on when a cheating flag was first observed
from a 3rd party service, vacbanned.com, that allows users
to enter a SteamID into a search box to check whether or not
that SteamID has been banned. If the account is banned,
the date the ban was first observed is provided. We also re-
crawled (between Oct. 18th and Oct. 29th 2011) all Steam
profiles discovered during the first crawl without a VAC ban,
to identify which non-cheaters had been flagged as cheaters
since April 2011. Of these, 43, 465 now have a VAC ban on
record.
Vacbanned.com had observed ban dates for 423,592 of the
cheaters we discovered during our initial crawl. Figure 1
Account All Edges Profiles Public Private Friends−Only Location− Set
All users 12,479,765 88,557,725 10,191,296 9,025,656 313,710 851,930 4,681,829
Cheaters - - 720,469 628,025 46,270 46,174 312,354
Table 1: Size of the Steam Community dataset.
shows a CDF of these ban observations over time. The ear-
liest dates indicate users that were banned prior to Decem-
ber 29th, 2009. We combined the “banned-since” dates from
our original crawl, vacbanned.com, and our re-crawl. In the
case of a user profile having more than one ban date (due
to the 3 sources), the earliest date was chosen. It is im-
portant to note that all ban dates were treated as “on or
before” as opposed to a precise timestamp. This is because
the ban dates are when the ban was first observed by a 3rd
party (vacbanned.com or our crawler), not necessarily when
it was applied by Valve.
In-game interactions: We have acquired detailed game
play logs of a 32-simultaneous player VAC-secured Team
Fortress 2 (TF2) server located in California. TF2 is a
critically-acclaimed, team-based, objective-oriented first-person
shooter game and is played on thousands of servers at any
given time. Our logs span just over 2 months from April 1 to
June 8, 2011, and consist of various game-specific events in-
volving 10, 354 players. Because this server is VAC-secured,
no players that have cheated in TF2 appear in the logs; the
only cheaters that appear are those that were caught in a
different game.
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Figure 1: Historical VAC ban dates as reported by
vacbanned.com. The date of discovery is on the x-
axis and the number of new banned accounts dis-
covered is on the logscale y-axis. The jump around
end of May 2011 is probably due to an effort from
the website to populate their database.
From the server logs we extracted 5 different interactions
types between users, and constructed an interaction graph
where an edge exists between two players if they interacted
together during the game. The resulting graph contained
10, 354 players of which 93 were cheaters and had 486, 808
edges.
4. CHEATERS AND THEIR GAMING HABITS
Although the majority of this work is concerned with how
cheaters and non-cheaters are positioned within the Steam
Community, it is worthwhile to first examine differences in
their behavior as gamers. This section explores and iden-
tifies how cheaters and non-cheaters differ with respect to
socio-gaming properties as well as game play and purchas-
ing habits.
4.1 Are cheaters social gamers?
Although previous work has indicated that gaming in gen-
eral is a social activity, one might question whether cheaters,
easily considered as anti-social actors by their very nature,
also engage in gaming as a social activity. As gaming is
a social activity we should expect users with more friends
to correspondingly invest more in the opportunity to game
with those friends. E.g., more games owned (to widen the
audience of potential play partners) and more hours played
(to increase the interaction time with said play partners).
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Figure 2: The number of games owned, and hours
played in the past two weeks as function of degree.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) plot the average number of games
owned and hours played in the two weeks prior to our crawl
as a function of degree, respectively. From Figure 2(a), we
observe that after a quick rise in the number of games owned
up to about 10 friends, there seems to be a slightly increas-
ing relationship between the number of friends a user has
and the number of games she owns, and that for cheaters,
even though they own fewer games than non-cheaters on av-
erage, this trend is more visible. We see a similar pattern
in Figure 2(b), with slightly more acute response from the
cheaters.
We suspect these increasing trends have to do with “peer
marketing.” Simply put, users see their friends playing games,
and make both purchasing and playtime decisions based on
this. As many games have such a heavy multiplayer focus,
the more friends a user has the more likely one of those
friends will be available to play any given game. This makes
sense when viewing gaming as a social activity: the more
friends you have, the more opportunity you have to play.
Further, because friendships on Steam Community are likely
to form due to in-game relationships and experiences, the
more hours a user plays, the greater her chance to create
new friendships. Ultimately, we believe Figure 2 is indica-
tive of a feedback cycle where users discover new friends
from the games they play, and discover new games from the
friends they play with.
In other words, the investment in gaming (both mone-
tary and time) increases with the number of friends for both
cheaters and non-cheaters. Even though cheaters are in-
volved in decidedly anti-social behavior, they still have a
positive response to the social phenomena of gaming. This
is an important result, as it introduces to the possibility of
VAC bans having more than just a utilitarian impact on
cheaters: not only is their technical ability to game affected,
but the ban might also effect their standing with their game-
play partners. In fact, in Section 5.3 we show that there are
indeed negative social effects associated with being branded
a cheater.
4.2 What kind of games do cheaters play?
As just described, cheaters’ gaming habits are positively
correlated with their social position. However, this does
not address questions regarding the kind of gaming cheaters
partake in. There are numerous ways to classify individual
games, and the Steam Store tags each games with a vari-
ety of categories. We decided to use the categories “single-
player” (the game can be played by a single human player)
and“multi-player” (the game supports multiple human play-
ers). This is a natural categorization for our purposes as
VAC bans only have an affect on multi-player games, and
all games are tagged in at least one of these categories. Some
games do not contain a single-player component at all (e.g.,
TF2). We classified these types of games as “multi-player
only” if they were tagged as multi-player but not single-
player, and those with no multi-player component are like-
wise classified as “single-player only”. Finally, we made use
of one additional category:“co-op”. Co-op, or cooperative,
games are loosely defined as multi-player games with a me-
chanic focusing on co-operative (as opposed to antagonistic)
interaction between human players. For example, players
might work together to defeat a horde of computer con-
trolled goblins [30], or to excavate a landscape and build a
city [26].
Figure 3 plots the number of games owned and and the
lifetime hours on record per game category for cheaters, non-
cheaters, and the newly flagged cheaters discovered in our
October re-crawl. First, we can see further confirmation of
gaming as a social-activity: gamers on Steam Community
are far more likely to own more than one multi-player games
than single-player games, even though there are over twice as
many single-player games available on Steam than there are
multi-player games. This trend is even clearer when consid-
ering single-player only games vs. multi-player only games.
Next, we observe that non-cheaters are more likely to own
more games than cheaters in general . However, we note
that cheaters are slightly more likely to own more than two
multi-player only games when compared to non-cheaters,
and that the difference in number of games owned between
cheaters and non-cheaters is smaller for multi-player games
than for single-player games. This is further indication that
cheaters are social gamers: even though they might not own
as many games as a whole, they are as interested in multi-
player games as non-cheaters are.
When considering the lifetime hours played per category,
we see a somewhat different story. The original cheaters
played far fewer hours of single-player games when compared
to both the non-cheaters and the newly flagged cheaters.
Further, the newly flagged cheaters and the non-cheaters
have very similar CDFs for hours played in single-player,
multi-player (only), and co-op games, however, this is not
true for single-player only games. This might be due to
the classification of currently popular (for cheating) games.
In any event, we see that cheaters are most definitely so-
cial gamers, favoring multi-player games over single-player
games for both purchase and play time. Specifically, cheaters
are much less interested in games without a multi-player
component.
5. CHEATERS AND THEIR FRIENDS
One line of thought in moral philosophy is that (non)ethical
behavior of an individual is heavily influenced by his social
ties [25]. Under this theory, cheaters should appear tightly
connected to other cheaters in the social network. On the
other hand, unlike in crime gangs as the ones presented in [1],
cheaters do not need to cooperate with each other to perform
their actions. Moreover, playing against other cheaters may
not be particularly productive. These observations suggest
that cheaters may be dispersed in the network, contradicting
thus the first intuition.
To understand the position of cheaters in the social net-
work, we investigate their relationships as measured by 1) their
number of friends and their cheating status (Section 5.1),
2) the in-game interactions with other players (Section 5.2)
and 3) sources of social closeness (Section 5.4).
5.1 Who is Friends with Cheaters?
The degree distribution of the Steam Community graph as
a whole, just cheater profiles, as well as for private, friends-
only profiles, and users without profiles are plotted as CCDF
in Figure 4. For users without a profile or private profiles,
edges in the graph are inferred based on the information
from public profiles that declare the user as a friend. From
the degree distributions we make two observations.
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Figure 4: Degree distributions for the Steam Com-
munity
First, we discovered a hard limit of 250 friends. However,
there are some users who have managed to circumvent this
hard limit. One user in particular has nearly 400 friends,
and through manual examination we observed this user’s
degree increasing by one or two friends every few days. Co-
incidentally, this profile also has a VAC ban on record.
Second, all categories plotted in Figure 4, with the ex-
ception of that of users with Steam accounts but no pro-
files, overlap, fitting the same power law distribution (co-
efficient of −0.92). Consequently, cheaters have about the
same number of declared friends as non-cheaters. The result
also shows that attempting to hide connection information
through private or friends-only privacy settings is unsuccess-
ful: in this case, the player’s privacy is determined by the
privacy settings of his friends.
While cheaters are mostly indistinguishable from non-cheaters
using the node degree distribution, a more important ques-
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Figure 3: CDF of the number of games owned and lifetime hours per category.
tion is whether or not cheaters act in complete isolation or
if their deviant behavior shows network effects. In other
words, are cheaters more likely to be friends with other
cheaters than with non-cheaters?
Figure 5(a) plots the CDF of the fraction of a player’s
friends who are cheaters. Figure 5(b) plots the CCDF of
the number of cheaters friends for both cheaters and non-
cheaters when varying the node degree. (This figure is com-
parable to Figure 4(a), but displays only the “cheating” de-
gree of users).
The picture that emerges from these two figures is a strik-
ing amount of homophily between cheaters: cheaters are
more likely to be friends with other cheaters. While nearly
70% of the non-cheaters have no friends that are cheaters,
70% of the cheaters have at least 10% cheaters as their
friends. Roughly 15% of cheaters have over half of their
friends other cheaters.
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Figure 5: (a) Fraction of cheaters’ friends that are
cheaters vs. the fraction of non-cheaters’ friends
that are cheaters. (b) CCDF of the number of
cheaters’ friends that are cheaters vs the number
of non-cheaters’ friends that are cheaters. I.e., the
“cheating degree” of the declared friendship network
for cheaters and non-cheaters.
We next estimated the diameter of the Steam Community
using the Hadoop-based DIameter estimator (HADI) [18].
HADI estimates the maximum, average and effective di-
ameter of a graph by computing the neighborhood function
N(h), which refers to the number of reachable pairs of nodes
within h hops of each other. This estimator iteratively in-
creases the number of hops h and stops when the difference
N(h)−N(h− 1) is zero or the search has stabilized to a set
of nodes.
We report on the following three diameter measures as
reported by HADI.
• The maximum diameter hmax is the value of h where
the iteration process stops.
• The effective diameter is the minimum number of hops
in which 90% of all connected pairs of nodes can reach
each other, i.e., when N(h) = 0.9N(hmax).
• The average diameter is the expected value of h over
the distribution of N(h) − N(h − 1), i.e., ∑hmaxh=1 h ∗
(N(h)−N(h− 1))/(N(hmax)−N(0)).
Table 2 presents these diameter measures for the Steam
Community as a whole, as well as the network composed
only of cheater-to-cheater edges (C-C). Furthermore, the
cheaters-only network is about 45% more stretched in com-
parison to the full social network, signifying that cheaters
must expend a lot more effort to reach each other through
only cheater-to-cheater edges. The effective and average di-
ameters, however, vary much less: a user can reach about
90% of the population in this planetary-scale network within
a maximum of 6 to 11 hops, even in the less tightly connected
cheaters subgraph. Previous studies reported similar results,
such as the low average path length of 6.6 hops between users
in the world-wide distributed MSN population [21].
We further investigate the distribution of the effective ra-
dius in the Steam Community. The effective radius for a
node v is defined as the 90th-percentile of all shortest dis-
tances from v [18]. Figure 6 shows the frequency distribution
of the various radii exhibited in the Steam Community and
C-C networks. The networks have a bi-modal structure with
respect to the radius distribution. The first maximum re-
flects the nodes that belong to the disconnected components
of each network (outsiders [18]). Nodes in the first dip and
Network Diameter
Maximum Effective Average
Social 15 7.01 6.22
Social C-C 22 8.61 7.00
Table 2: Diameter measures. The maximum diam-
eter of the cheaters-only subgraphs is significantly
larger than the average and effective diameters.
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Figure 6: Distribution of radius in the Steam Com-
munity as a whole and the cheater-to-cheater net-
work.
under the second maximum belong to the “core” of the gi-
ant connected component (GCC) of each network. Nodes on
the second maximum are the vast majority of well-connected
nodes in the GCC. Furthermore, the “whiskers” [22] are the
nodes connected to the GCC with longer paths than other
nodes and can be seen on the long tail of each plot, thus
responsible for its second negative slope. Our results on
the Steam Community networks verify the observations for
the bi-modal behavior of social networks, and in particular
LinkedIn [18].
5.2 Who Plays with Cheaters?
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Figure 7: (a) CCDF of the declared friendship de-
gree and interaction degree of users from a popular
TF2 server. (b) CCDF of the number of interactions
between declared and non-declared pairs of friend
players on a popular TF2 server.
To investigate if the declared friendships reflect in-game
interactions and if cheaters have similar playing patterns
with non-cheaters, we studied the 2-month interaction net-
work generated from the TF2 server logs. Figure 7(a) plots
a CCDF of the declared friendship degree as well as the
interaction degree for players appearing in the interaction
network. We first note that even on a single server for a sin-
gle game, players generally interact with considerably more
players than they have declared friendships with. We note,
however, that the correlation between the number of de-
clared friends and the number of unique interaction partners
is low (Pearson coefficient 0.16). This suggests that being
popular in the social network does not necessarily translate
to an increase in unique interaction partners.
We also compare the number of interactions between de-
clared friends and players that are not declared friends (Fig-
ure 7(b)). The plot suggests that players with a declared
friendship interact with each other more often than players
without a declared friendship. This indicates that Steam
Community friendships are representative of in-game inter-
actions: Steam Community friends are more likely to inter-
act in-game than players who are not friends in the social
network.
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Figure 8: CCDF of the number interactions between
declared and non-declared pairs of players, with at
least one user in the pair being a cheater in (a) or a
non-cheater in (b), on a popular TF2 server.
We next ask: “Are cheaters ostracized by non-cheaters
during gameplay?” We begin to answer this question by
examining how cheaters interact with declared and non-
declared friends. Figures 8(a) and 8(b) plot the CCDF of
the number of pairwise interactions, with at least one mem-
ber of the pair being a cheater (or non-cheater), for both
declared and non-declared Steam Community friendships.
There are two important observations that result from
these plots. First, we see that cheaters, like the population
of the server as a whole, are likely to have more interactions
with declared friends (than with other players). Second,
we notice that interacting pairs with at least one cheater in
the pair have fewer absolute interactions than the server as
whole.
Since TF2 games are between competing teams, players
on the same team have the ability to have cooperative in-
teractions, and those on opposing teams have the opportu-
nity to have antagonistic interactions. If players had over-
whelmingly negative feelings towards cheaters, one would
expect cheaters to be involved in fewer cooperative inter-
actions than antagonistic interactions, e.g,. players might
banish those with a cheating flag in a form of vigilante jus-
tice. This does not seem to be the case as Figures 9(a)
and 9(b) demonstrate, which present the CCDF of num-
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Figure 9: CCDF of the number unique gameplay
friends and foes of cheaters and non-cheaters.
ber of unique “friend”(cooperative) and “foe”(antagonistic)
partners for cheaters and non-cheaters, respectively. While
cheaters tend to have slightly fewer unique gameplay part-
ners than non-cheaters, the difference is negligible, indicat-
ing that the cheater/non-cheater status of a player does not
hold much weight during active gaming sessions.
5.3 Are Cheaters in Disgrace?
While aggregate-level information shows little differenti-
ation between cheaters and non-cheaters, the effect of the
VAC-ban mark can better be understood by analyzing the
transition of profiles from non-cheater to cheater. We now
proceed to answer the following two questions: 1) Are cheaters
shamed by the mark on their permanent record? and 2) Does
the community shun cheaters once their transgressions are
revealed?
Of the new cheaters discovered from our re-crawl, 87%
had no change in privacy state, and nearly 10% changed
their privacy setting from public to a more restrictive set-
ting. In comparison, in our control group of re-crawled non-
cheaters, privacy settings remained unchanged for over 97%
of users, and less than 3% changed to a more restrictive set-
ting. Cheaters seem to choose higher level of privacy once
their sins are laid bare, perhaps in the naive hope that a
more restrictive setting will provide a measure of protection
from a potentially disapproving community.
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Figure 10: CDF of net change in cheaters’ and non-
cheaters’ neighborhood size.
But is the local community disapproving? Figures 10 plots
the CDF of net change in the degrees for cheaters and non-
cheaters. Of the still public cheaters in our re-crawl, 43%
had a net loss in degree, 13% had a net gain in degree, and
43% had no change in degree. Of the non-cheaters in our
new crawl, 25% had a net loss in degree, 36% had a net
gain in degree, and 39% had no change in degree. While
both sets of users exhibited fluctuations in the size of their
neighborhoods, more cheaters lost friends than non-cheaters,
and more non-cheaters gained friends. Treated as a whole,
cheaters lost nearly twice as many friends as they gained,
and non-cheaters gained twice as many friends as they lost.
While non-cheaters continue to gain new friends, cheaters,
while not overtly ostracized, appear to be unable to make
new friends and may lose a few of their previous ones.
There are several explanations for the changes in neigh-
borhood sizes we observed. First, evidence suggests that
online gamers “clean up” their friends lists to remove peo-
ple they no longer play with [32]. However, because so few
users are near the 250 user limit (as seen in Figure 4(a)),
we do not believe this is the primary contributing factor to
neighborhood size fluctuations. A second explanation is that
the Steam client, by default, issues “pop up” notifications
that are visible in game whenever a friend starts playing
any game. If you have many friends, the pop ups could be-
come very distracting, possibly prompting users to remove
friendships of people they no longer actively play with. A
final explanation, especially with respect to the net loss in
cheaters’ degrees is that cheaters are deliberately severing
their ties once they are caught cheating. We observed one
account in particular that went from 200 to 0 friends after
the VAC ban was issued. “Social suicide” might account for
large decreases in degree, as it is far more probable that
the cheater himself deletes friends, rather than each of his
friends deleting the cheater.
5.4 Are Cheaters Close?
In order to quantify the strength of the relationship be-
tween cheaters based on the social network and the profile
attributes we have, we employ two metrics, one geographi-
cal, another social.
5.4.1 Geographic Closeness
The geographical closeness may give quantitative support
to the theory proposed in [12] according to which our po-
sition to cheating is culturally (and thus, to some extend,
geographically) based. A first observation is that user pop-
ulation on Steam Community does not follow real-world ge-
ographic population and, more importantly, cheaters are not
uniformly distributed. Figure 11 shows Steam Community
populations for the twelve countries comprising the top ten
user populations and the top ten cheater populations. The
figure shows that cheaters are vastly overrepresented in some
locations: for example, there are about 55,000 cheaters in
the Nordic European countries (12.4% of the playing popu-
lation of the region), while there are about 39,000 cheaters
(3.9%) in the US. In particular, we found enough Steam
profiles to account for nearly 2.5% of Denmark’s 5.5 mil-
lion residents, of which cheaters account for nearly 0.5% of
Denmark’s population.
We continued our analysis by examining the physical dis-
tance between declared friends. We first constructed the
location network by including an edge from the social net-
work if and only if both end points had a known location.
This lead to a reduction in the size of the network, which
can be seen in Table 3, along with the geo-social properties
of the resulting location network. We note that a subgraph
composed entirely of cheater-to-cheater relationships has a
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Figure 11: User and cheater populations per country
normalized to real world population of said country.
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creasing order of their real-world populations.
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Figure 12: CDF of link length for Steam Community
location network.
lower mean distance between nodes and average link length
than the graph as a whole.
The cumulative distribution function of link length for
the location network is plotted in Figure 12. About 50%
of all link lengths in all networks are less than 500 km. In
general, cheater-to-cheater relationships tend to be closer
than the network as a whole. This indication that cheaters
tend to form relationship with each other over closer dis-
tances than the network as a whole, in conjunction with the
non-uniform geographic distribution of cheaters leads us to
explore how cheaters are positioned in the network from a
geo-social perspective
We thus decide to measure node locality, a geo-social met-
ric introduced in [27]. The node locality of a given node
quantifies how close (geographically) it is to all of its neigh-
bors in the social graph, and scales it proportional to the
geographic network in which the node is embedded. Thus, a
node locality of 1.0 indicates that a given node is at least as
close to all of its neighbors as any other node in the graph
is to their neighbors, and a value of 0.0 indicates that a
given node is further away from all its neighbors than any
other node in the graph. Measuring node locality answers
two questions for us: 1) Does the Steam Community ex-
hibit properties of a location-based social network? and
2) Do cheaters tend to form geographically closer relation-
ships with other cheaters than non-cheaters?
We plot the CDF of node locality for the location net-
work, the cheater-to-cheater subgraph, as well as just the
cheaters within the location network in Figure 13. We first
note that about 40% of users in the location network have
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Figure 13: CDF of node locality.
a node locality of above 0.90, a phenomena exhibited by
other geographic online social networks such as BrightKite
and FourSquare [27]. Next, we observe that while play-
ers with low locality are more common in the cheater-to-
cheater network than in the whole network, the trend re-
verses with more players with a node locality of over 0.75
than in the cheater-to-cheater network. Finally, when con-
sidering only the cheaters embedded within the entire net-
work, we see drastically lower node locality, with only about
10% of cheaters having a node locality greater than 0.90.
These characterization results lead to three observations:
1) friendships tend to form between geographically close
users; 2) cheaters tend to form relationships with other nearby
cheaters and these links are geographically even shorter than
those formed by non-cheaters, and 3) as evidenced by their
lower node locality when considering all friends (cheaters
and non-cheaters), cheaters appear to befriend geographi-
cally remote non-cheaters. This might indicate that cheaters
form relationships with cheaters via a different mechanism
than they form relationships with non-cheaters. While cheater-
to-cheater relationships seem to be geographically constrained,
their relationships with non-cheaters are over significantly
larger distances.
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Figure 14: Average node locality as a function of
degree.
Figure 14 plots average node locality as a function of de-
gree. We can see that in all cases, node locality decreases
slowly as the degree of the users increases. This is intu-
itive as the more friends a user has, the less likely she is to
be geographically close to all of them. However, we note
that while there is a decline in locality when the degree of
a node gets very close to the limit of 250 friends, the net-
Network N K 〈Duv〉 (km) 〈luv〉 (km) 〈NL〉 〈GC〉
Steam Community 4,342,670 26,475,896 5,896 1,853 0.79 0.154
Steam Community Cheater-to-Cheater 190,041 353,331 4,607 1,761 0.79 0.074
BrightKite 54,190 213,668 5,683 2,041 0.82 0.165
FourSquare 58,424 351,216 4,312 1,296 0.85 0.237
LiveJournal 992,886 29,645,952 6,142 2,727 0.73/0.71 0.146
Twitter 409,093 182,986,353 6,087 5,117 0.57/0.49 0.108
Table 3: Location network properties: the number of nodes N, edges K, mean distance between users 〈Dij〉,
average link length 〈lij〉, average node locality 〈NL〉, and average geographic clustering coefficient 〈GC〉. The
FourSquare, BrightKite, LiveJournal, and Twitter properties are from [27].
work as a whole has some users of high degree with higher
node locality than might otherwise be expected. This might
be indicative of popular users being popular within a geo-
graphically constrained portion of the network. I.e., popular
users are popular with people that are geographically close
to them, but not so much on a global level.
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Figure 15: CDF of geographic clustering coefficient.
The geographic clustering coefficient measures how tightly
clustered triangles of users are with respect to the geographic
distance between connected triples [27]. The CDF for geo-
graphic clustering coefficient is plotted in Figures 15. Cheaters
embedded within both the Steam Community tend to have
lower geographic clustering coefficients. As a whole, around
10% of the network has a geographic clustering coefficient
larger than 0.5 with 4% having over 0.9. For embedded
cheaters, we see only 5% with a geographic clustering coeffi-
cient of over 0.5 and 2% greater than 0.9. While a larger pro-
portion of cheaters have a geographic clustering coefficient
greater than 0.015 than non-cheaters, this trend quickly re-
verses, with about 40% of the whole network having a ge-
ographic clustering coefficient greater than 0.1 versus 30%
of embedded cheaters. We also see that only about 30% of
users in the cheater-to-cheater network, have a geographic
clustering coefficient over 0.01. This is contrast to over
about 65% for the entire location network and the cheaters
embedded within it.
These numbers are interesting for several reasons. First,
about 30% of users have a geographic clustering coefficient
greater than the average of their respective graphs. Next,
cheaters tend to form more geographically dispersed triples
when compared to non-cheaters, drastically so if we con-
sider triples formed exclusively of cheaters. Finally, while
we do see evidence of relatively tight geographic cluster-
ing, likely due to latency related quality of service concerns
for multi-player gaming, we suspect that relationships are
formed around community run servers, thus the distance
between triples of users is less important than the distance
of triples consisting of two users and a server. This is a
hypothesis we are planning to test in future work.
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Figure 16: Average geographic clustering coefficient
as a function of degree.
The geographic clustering coefficient as a function of de-
gree is plotted in Figures 16. We can see that the geographic
clustering coefficient decreases dramatically as the degree of
a node increases. In other words, the more friends a user
has, the less likely those relationships form geographically
close triples, an intuitive result.
5.4.2 Social Closeness
The second measure of social strength is based on a pre-
vious study [24] that suggests that the overlap between the
social neighborhood of two individuals is a good indicator of
the strength of their relationship. We study the overlap of
friends of users in the Steam Community networks to under-
stand whether cheaters exhibit a stronger relationship with
other cheaters than fair players do with fair players. We as-
sess the strength of the relationship between two connected
users by the overlap between their sets of friends, computed
as follows:
Overlapuv = muv/((ku − 1) + (kv − 1)−muv)
where muv is the number of common neighbors between
users u and v, ku is the number of neighbors of user u and kv
is the number of neighbors of user v. This overlap is calcu-
lated on the friendship network of all users, considering 1.5
million pairs of cheaters (i.e., all cheater pairs) and 1.5 mil-
lion of randomly selected pairs of non-cheaters (i.e., about
2% of the existing non-cheater pairs). We also calculate
the overlap of pairs of cheaters (non-cheaters) when consid-
ering only their cheater (non-cheater) overlapping contacts
instead of their whole neighborhood.
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Figure 17: CDF of contacts overlap at the friendship
network for cheater and non-cheater pairs. We con-
sider all available neighbors and also only the same
kind (C-C or NC-NC).
From Figure 17 we observe an increase in the overlap of
both cheater pairs in C-C and non-cheater pairs in NC-NC
in comparison to the respective overlaps in the overall so-
cial network (i.e. considering both types of contacts). This
result demonstrates that relationships are weaker between
different types of players, i.e. cheaters with non-cheaters or
non-cheaters with cheaters.
5.5 How do cheaters congregate?
Steam Community groups allow a set of users to con-
gregate together, providing tools such as event scheduling,
group chat, notifications, group level play statistics, and the
ability to call out a particular user for exemplary service to
the group. Previous research on player grouping has tended
to focus on in-game grouping mechanisms. For example,
guilds in World of War craft have been examined in in [10, 9,
3]. Steam groups differ from most previously studied group
constructs for gaming in that they exist separate from any
specific game. Thus, by definition, Steam group relation-
ships persist across games and gaming sessions. It is also
important to note that users are allowed to be a member
of more than one Steam group; most in-game grouping con-
structs enforce either a single group per user rule, with some
allowing for hierarchical multi-group organization.
Group membership was determined by querying the crawled
users’ group memberships. I.e., the list of groups, as well as
each group’s members were inferred from information in user
profiles. Because of this there are two caveats: 1) users with
private profiles are not included in the data set and 2) there
are likely some group members that were not discovered via
our crawl. Both of these mean that our results might differ
slightly from ground truth, however, they should be pretty
close.
We discovered over 5 million users that were members of
at least one of over 1 million groups. Of cheaters with public
profiles, 65.4% are a member of at least one group, vs 58.2%
of non-cheaters. Table 4 contains additional details of this
data set.
Perhaps coincidentally, Ducheneaut et al. found that 66%
of observed World of Warcraft characters were a member
of a guild [10], very similar to the observed percentage of
cheaters in a group. This number trended much higher for
characters with higher levels, and the indications were that
guilds provided both a measurable advantage to members,
and also exerted significant “social pressure” on members to
Users in at least one group 5, 302, 072
Cheaters in at least one group 410, 704
Groups 1, 487, 551
Groups with at least 2 members 1, 160, 793
Average group members 20.9
Average groups per user 3.56
Maximum groups per user 2, 380
Table 4: Details for groups data set inferred from
the Steam Community profiles data set.
increase game play time. Although Steam groups are not
directly part of any game play mechanics that we are aware
of, it is likely that they fill a similar role as guilds. As very,
very few cheaters are using cheats they created themselves,
we suspect that they use Steam groups as a mechanism to
discover like minded individuals and distribute cheating in-
formation (i.e., to gain a measurable in-game advantage).
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Figure 18: CDF of the members per group and
groups per user.
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Figure 19: CDF (a) and CCDF (b) of the number
of groups per user for cheaters and non-cheaters.
Figure 18 plots the members per group and groups per
user as a CDF. 90% of the over 1 million groups had less
than 31 members, and only 1% had more than 150 members.
These membership numbers are similar to the observed sizes
of guilds in World of Warcraft where the 90th percentile of
the membership distribution was found to be 35 [10]. Of the
over 5 million users in at least one group, about 35% were
in one, and only one, group with 80% of users in less than
10 groups. Surprisingly, cheaters are somewhat more likely
to be a member of more groups than non-cheaters, as seen
in Figure 19.
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Figure 20: Fraction of group members that are
cheaters for groups with a minimum of 2 members.
We next examined how cheaters and non-cheaters are rep-
resented in the group membership rolls. We began by dis-
carding groups with less than two members, as at least two
members are required for a social relationship to exist. Of
the remaining groups, we plot the fraction of members that
are cheaters as a CDF in Figure 20. We see that cheaters
are not evenly distributed in groups. In fact, in approxi-
mately 10% of groups non-cheaters are a minority. We be-
lieve these observations indicate that cheaters are making
use of the grouping mechanism for different purposes than
non-cheaters.
6. PROPAGATION OF CHEATING
How does cheating behavior spread in the Steam Commu-
nity? An approximation of this question may be answered
by investigating how cheating bans propagate in the network
over time (Section 6.1). Another way to answer this ques-
tion is to evaluate the position of influence of the cheaters in
the network: can they influence indirectly connected players
due to their network centrality (Section 6.2)?
6.1 How Does Cheating Propagate over Time?
Based on the observed homophile behavior of cheaters, we
hypothesize that the friends of known cheaters are at risk of
becoming cheaters themselves.
To test this hypothesis, we explored whether cheaters dis-
covered during a given time interval were more likely to be
friends of previously discovered cheaters than to be friends
with non-cheaters. Again, we stress that banned dates must
be treated as “on or before” as opposed to exact timestamps.
To mitigate the effects of this uncertainty, we chose to ex-
amine cheaters discovered over 180-day intervals.
We begin by assuming that all users in the Steam Commu-
nity friendship network are non-cheaters. We then initialize
the network by marking the 94, 522 users found to have a
VAC ban on or before Dec. 29, 2009 (i.e., the earliest date
retrieved from vacbanned.com). For the first time interval
between Dec. 30, 2009 and Jun. 28, 2010, 34, 681 players
were found to have a VAC ban. For these users, we calcu-
lated and plotted the number and fraction of their cheater
friends (i.e., from the 94, 522 cheaters found previously). We
repeat these steps for another 3 time intervals, with 19, 294,
571, 975, and 43, 465 cheaters found in each. The third inter-
val (starting at Dec. 26, 2010) contains the bulk of cheaters,
since their VAC ban was first observed by our initial crawl
(and not from vacbanned.com). However, as shown next,
the differentiation between cheaters and non-cheaters holds
true for all intervals. In addition to a best effort approxima-
tion of the timestamp of the VAC bans, the data constructed
this way has another caveat: the social network is from our
March/April 2011 crawl, but we show in Section 5.3 that
the network is quite dynamic. We verified that despite the
change in number of friends over time, the trend is preserved:
we recalculated the fraction of cheaters in the 1 hop neigh-
borhoods of users based on the state of their relationships
as determined by our October 2011 re-crawl and we found
that the non-cheaters CDF to dominate the cheaters CDF
as in Figure 5.
Figures 21(a) and 21(b) plot the results of our experi-
ments. Each subplot represents only the cheaters discovered
during the corresponding time interval, and an equal number
of randomly sampled non-cheaters. The number of cheater
friends and fraction of cheater friends values are computed
based on users that were known to be cheaters prior to the
start of the interval. From the plots we see clear evidence
that users with both a higher absolute number of cheater
friends, as well as those with proportionally more cheater
friends are more likely to become cheaters themselves. In
other words, cheating behavior appears to spread through
the social network over friendship links.
6.2 Are Cheaters in Positions of Influence?
Centrality metrics identify important and thus influen-
tial nodes in a social network. To study a player’s impor-
tance in the Steam Community social network we used two
traditional centrality metrics: degree centrality and node
betweenness centrality. The degree centrality of a node is
simply the degree of the node in the network, and is thus
a local metric. The betweenness centrality of a node, how-
ever, measures the importance of the node in mediating the
traffic along the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes.
Betweenness centrality is thus a global graph measure and
consequently computationally expensive to calculate, requir-
ing the calculation of the shortest paths between all pairs of
nodes in the network. Due to the scale of our graphs, we
approximate betweenness centrality using κ–path centrality,
a betweenness approximation method proposed in [2].
The κ–path centrality estimates the betweenness of a node
in a network of n nodes and m edges by using random sim-
ple walks of length κ from random points in the network.
To reduce the additive error on the betweenness estima-
tion to at most n1/2+α, with probability at least 1 − 1/n2,
and in time O(κ3n2−2α logn), this process is performed T =
2κ2n1−2α lnn iterations, where α ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] controls the
tradeoff between accuracy and computation time. The pa-
rameter κ was set to ln(n+m) and α was set to 0.2, as they
offer near optimal performance [2]. To further reduce the
running time, we ran the randomized algorithm for comput-
ing κ–path centrality in parallel (the algorithm allows for
independent parallelism).
When we consider all users in the social network, we ob-
serve a very high correlation of 0.9731 between degree and
betweenness centrality scores of users. This high correla-
tion remains consistent when we differentiate on the type of
the user. Thus, when considering cheaters only, the corre-
lation is 0.9817, and when considering non-cheaters only it
is 0.9726. This level of correlation implies that if a player
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Figure 21: The spreading of cheating behavior in the Steam Community over four 180-day time intervals. The
inset plot shows the calculation for the final state of the network, disregarding discovery dates. A randomly
selected control sample of non-cheaters is used for comparison in each time interval.
has many friends in the Steam Community network, i.e.,
high degree centrality, not only can she influence many other
players directly (or locally), but also mediate the informa-
tion flow between remote players due to her expected high
betweenness centrality. If this player is a cheater, she could
facilitate the propagation of cheat code and other deviant
behavior to distant parts of the social network.
We extend this analysis and focus only on the most cen-
tral players in the network and study how many of them are
cheaters. The results, shown in Table 5, demonstrate that
the cheaters are under-represented among the most central
users of the social network (despite the fact that they have
about the same degree distribution as the fair players, as
shown in Figure 4 (a)). Over 7% of the entire player pop-
ulation in our dataset are cheaters, but they make up less
than 7% of the top-1% most central players, and are not
adequately represented until we consider the top-5% to top-
10% most central players. Earlier results from Section 5.3
might provide an explanation for this. There seems to be
social mechanisms that retard the growth of cheaters’ social
neighborhoods which could be preventing them from enter-
ing the top-1% central players in the social network.
7. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Online gaming has recently become the largest revenue-
generating segment of the entertainment industry, with mil-
lions of geographically dispersed players engaging each other
within the confines of virtual worlds. An ethical system is
created along with the rules that govern the games. Just
Top-N% DC BC
0.1 3.25 5.16
0.5 4.46 5.95
1.0 5.11 6.35
5.0 7.06 7.86
10.0 8.20 8.58
Table 5: Percentage of cheaters found in top-N% of
high degree centrality (DC) and betweenness cen-
trality (BC) users in the Steam Community.
like in the real world, some players make the decision to cir-
cumvent the established rules to gain an unfair advantage,
a practice actively discouraged by the industry and frowned
upon by gamers themselves. This paper examined charac-
teristics of these unethical actors in a large online gaming
social network.
Due to the scale of our dataset, the majority of our com-
putations used the MapReduce framework via the python
mrjob interface for Hadoop on Amazon Elastic MapReduce.
Our MapReduce stages involved graph pre-processing, game-
play statistics computations, geographical data processing,
computing degree distribution, computing intersections of
sets, and computing geo-social metrics. Our MapReduce
solutions included several MapReduce pipelines (chains of
map tasks and reduce tasks) of smaller subtasks.
At a high level, viewed from the perspective of global
network metrics, cheaters are well embedded in the social
network, largely indistinguishable from fair players. This
is not entirely unexpected. Cheaters are still gamers, and
even though they are permanently marked, they are still
members of the community. We observed evidence of this
by examining both the social network and interaction logs
from a multiplayer gaming server, where cheaters were not
targeted or treated overly different from non-cheaters.
However, when we examine the transition from non-cheater
to cheater, we observe the effects of the cheating brand.
First, cheating behavior appears to spread through a social
mechanism, where the presence and the number of cheater
friends of a fair player is correlated with the likelihood of her
becoming a cheater in the future. Consequently, cheaters
end up having more cheater friends than the non-cheaters
have. Second, we observed that cheaters are likely to switch
to more restrictive privacy settings once they are caught, a
sign that they might be uncomfortable with the VAC ban.
Finally, we found that cheaters lose friends over time com-
pared to non-cheaters, an indication that there is a social
penalty involved with cheating.
Cheater distribution does not follow geographical, real-
world population density. The fact that some regions have
higher percentages of cheaters to the player population may
suggest that cheating behavior is inspired by the tighter
geo-social clustering specific to a geo-social culture. Such
cheating-prone communities can be the target of more scrutiny
or are the result of higher tolerance to cheating behavior,
both in the legislature and in the gaming population.
Our study has consequences for gaming in particular, but
also for other online social networks with unethical members.
In the case of gaming, individual servers can evaluate the
cheating risk of a new player by looking at a combination of
attributes inferred from the player’s profile that include the
fraction of VAC-banned friends. Our preliminary investiga-
tions in this direction show that traditional machine learn-
ing algorithms (such as logistical regression, naive Bayes,
and decision trees) can classify players as cheaters or non-
cheaters with accuracy between 65% and 74%. More work
in this direction is left for the future.
In the case of general online social networks, the findings
of our study can be used to better understand the effects
of countermeasures to deal with anti-social behavior. For
example, the profiles of users who abuse the available com-
munication tools for political activism or personal market-
ing, or who appear to automate their actions could be pub-
licly tagged. Our study gives a preliminary indication that,
over time, the reaction of fair users to such information will
make it harder to benefit from forms of anti-social behav-
iors that attempt to harness network effects. The fair users
tend to have a vested interest in maintaining the quality of
the shared social space and will limit the connectivity of the
abusing profiles.
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